Authors: Judit Ricz, Andrea Éltető

In: Society and Economy in Central and Eastern Europe, 48(2), 64-91.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.14267/1588970X.2026.015

Abstract

The article analyses non-state actor (NSA) agency at the intersection of autocratisation and new industrial policies. We focus on Hungary, an EU Member State that aims to become a leading global player in the electric vehicle sector, particularly in EV battery production. Besides the already functioning South Korean plants, numerous Chinese firms have been attracted to the country by extremely generous state support to build giga-factories. However, battery-related plants face opposition from the local population. Under the Hungarian autocratic regime, the space for NSA agency is increasingly shrinking, yet our focus is narrowed to analysing non-governmental organisations. We ask whether organised civil society can exercise political or domain-specific agency in an autocratising regime. Bottom-up initiatives against the battery factories mushroomed in all the affected Hungarian localities, which increasingly cooperated with each other, and even set up an umbrella organisation at the national level. Some important achievements are documented. To illustrate the causes of the limited non-state actor activism and nevertheless account for how impactful changes have occurred, the article analyses the experiences of two local associations: GÖD-ÉRT (the For Göd Association) and MIAKÖ (the Mothers of Mikepércs for the Environment Association). At the time of study, both have been forced to operate in an increasingly repressive setting.

A Ricz, J., Éltető, A.: The non-state actor contestation of battery factory investments in Hungary: the activism of GÖD-ÉRT and MIAKÖ bejegyzés először VGI-én jelent meg.

Authors: Judit Ricz, Andrea Éltető In: Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 1–29. (2026).

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17487870.2026.2680291

Abstract

New industrial policy has (re-)gained legitimacy in scholarly debates recently, as a means to boost and direct development. This article argues that autocratic leaders may exploit this policy to strengthen their domestic and international power position. By combining international and comparative political economy perspectives, we analyse the main logic, instruments, and limits of the Hungarian government’s new industrial policy to promote the electric vehicle battery sector. The case study illustrates how the Orbán regime manipulated the institutional and regulatory setting and applied selective (non-)enforcement of regulations – theorised as autocratic forbearance – to create locational advantages for Asian battery firms.

A Ricz, J., Éltető, A.: Rules for sale: autocratic forbearance, as a new industrial policy tool to promote the Hungarian battery hub bejegyzés először VGI-én jelent meg.

Authors: Judit Ricz, Andrea Éltető

In: Problems of Post-Communism, 1–15.

DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2025.2459268

Abstract

Why does Hungary, a small peripheral economy within the EU, aspire to become the second-largest European battery producer by 2030? Our principal aim is to explain Hungary’s ambitious pursuit of the state-sponsored creation of this new sector. We argue that the Hungarian strategy does not align with the real developmental state approach and that the best way to understand it is to combine the dependency and illiberalism arguments, building on recent developments in the comparative capitalism field. The Hungarian case underscores the primary limitations of these theories in comprehending contemporary changes and challenges, including the misapplication of green industrial policy.

A Ricz, J., Éltető, A.: Paradoxes of Green Transition and Developmentalism: The Case of EV Battery Production in Hungary bejegyzés először VGI-én jelent meg.

Captured green aims: The case of Hungary

Abstract

A Éltető, A., Ricz, J.: Captured green aims: The case of Hungary bejegyzés először VGI-én jelent meg.