Author: Veronika Czina

In: ELTE CERS, Institute of World Economics Working Paper Nr. 283 (2026) August

Abstract

What makes a rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU successful? Existing studies have broadly argued that there are objective criteria based on which the performance of the Council Presidency can be evaluated e.g. being an honest-broker, agenda-setter, successful mediator etc. While doing so, they have problematically assumed that all Member States aim to achieve this goal when taking the helm at the EU and they disregarded the fact that renegade, EU-critical Member States might have other goals to achieve during the Presidency period. In this paper, I critically engage with the literature evaluating Presidencies’ success through the case study of Hungary’s Council Presidency of 2024. This is an interesting example because Hungary has been at odds with the EU in many ways in the past two decades, and even more so more recently, therefore, the Hungarian Presidency was a highly contested event, to an extent that some EU institutions even wanted to cancel or boycott some parts of it. Despite the controversy, Hungary held the position of the chair for six months, and it did not fail, especially not from the perspective of its own strategic priorities. Overall, Hungary’s case demonstrates that we need to rethink how we evaluate the rotating Presidency and how we define success. This paper argues that there is a difference between what counts as successful from the perspective of the EU and that of the presiding Member State. Moreover, if a Member State wants to and can exert national preferences during its mandate, then the Presidency can be considered successful, at least from the national perspective.

A Czina, V.: When The Renegade Takes The Wheel: Lessons Learned From Hungary’s 2024 Council Presidency bejegyzés először VGI-én jelent meg.

Author: Veronika Czina

In: Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics, 10(1), 171-188.

DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v10i1.1212

Abstract

The effectiveness of post-accession conditionality within the EU has been of pivotal importance for the EU in past years. The European Union has plenty of tools for monitoring the compliance of EU Member States; however, when it comes to enforcement mechanisms, EU institutions perform poorly. Respect for the rule of law is especially crucial in this regard, as certain Member States (i.e. Poland and Hungary) have committed violations in this area. Hungary has been subject to several infringement procedures due to failure to comply with EU law, and the Article 7 procedure has even been activated against it. In 2020, the EU decided to connect rule-of-law violations to the EU budget disbursement by introducing the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism, which was launched against Hungary in 2022. This paper evaluates this conditionality mechanism through the example of Hungary and assesses whether it is more effective than the previous tools used to address rogue Member State behaviour and prevent continuous rule-of-law violations on a national level.

A Czina, V.: The effectiveness of the EU’s rule of law conditionality mechanism bejegyzés először VGI-én jelent meg.

Author: Veronika Czina

In: 20 years of EU membership Paper Series, University of Malta, 2024

Abstract

It has been more than a decade since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán acquired power in Hungary with a two-thirds majority in Parliament and set up a government that has been openly contradicting EU rules and legislation in more than one policy areas. The freedom of the press, the independence of the judiciary, academic freedom, the fundamental rights of refugees, minority rights and corruption are among those areas where Hungary was vastly criticized by one or more EU institutions in the past years. The EU has several means to address rogue Member State behavior. Some of them, for example infringement proceedings, are regularly used to monitor Member State compliance, whereas others, such as the Article 7 procedure, have been seldom applied and with no tangible results. In April 2022 the rule of law mechanism has been activated against Hungary and resulted in withdrawing EU funds from Hungary. These – rule of law monitoring – procedures are different in nature and would have different consequences if they were carried out entirely, however, should Hungary comply with them, they could have serious impacts on the domestic policy-making mechanisms of the country. This paper evaluates the EU’s post-accession conditionality mechanisms through the example of Hungary and tries to find out what are the most effective tools of the Union to address rogue Member State behavior.

A Czina, V.:  The Effectiveness of the EU’s Post-Accession Conditionality in the Case of Hungary bejegyzés először VGI-én jelent meg.

Authors: Marton Varju, Veronika Czina, Katalin Cseres, Ernő Várnay

In: Politics and Governance, 12, Article 7473

DOI: https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7473

Abstract

The EU member states have been using the action for annulment to challenge the legality of EU measures while pursuing a range of non-legal and essentially political motivations. This also holds for the V4 member states, which have also resorted to annulment actions to judicialize their legislative conflicts within the EU before the CJEU. Among the V4, Poland has been the most frequent litigant, using this institutional tool increasingly actively during the last 10 years. Poland’s behavior appears to confirm expectations of differentiation among this group of member states. It also coincides with a period of political change marked by deep legislative conflicts within the EU. The V4 annulment challenges against EU legislative measures usually made a genuine effort to achieve the legal objective of annulling the challenged legal act. However, there is evidence that they also pursued certain political motivations or a combination of them. These could include the securing of gains in domestic politics, avoiding the local costs of an EU policy misfit and/or promoting a preferred policy position, and/or influencing EU competence arrangements. In a few cases, the litigant member state aimed to avoid concrete material disadvantages. Securing a legal interpretation from the CJEU that would influence the behavior of other EU actors or clarify the law affecting the position of the applicant member state also motivated some of the V4 legal challenges.

A Varju, M., Czina, V., Cseres, K., Várnay, E.: Annulment Actions and the V4: Taking Legislative Conflicts Before the CJEU bejegyzés először VGI-én jelent meg.

Author: Veronika Czina

In: Allegra Wirmer, Irene Rusconi (eds.) How can an expanding EU best protect rule of law and democracy? European Council Experts’ Debrief, February 2024, pp. 5-6.

Abstract

The institutions of the EU have been busy trying to reform the EU’s rule of law protection toolkit in the past few years. However, it seems like there is still room for improvement: rule-breaking Member States can still control the narrative, as exemplified by the vote on Ukraine’s aid package in which Hungary had to be pressured and lobbied into supporting the decision. However, when it comes to the rule of law, such soft methods have proven ineffective so far, so it is time to focus on enforcement. The EU needs a clear strategy and Member States’ willingness is essential to address rule of law violating behaviour.

A Czina, V.: Challenges in protecting rule of law: the Hungarian case and EU responses bejegyzés először VGI-én jelent meg.

Authors: Veronika Czina, Tamás Szigetvári, Gábor Túry

In: Kaeding, M., Pollak, J., Schmidt, P. (eds) Enlargement and the Future of Europe. Springer, Cham, (2023). pp. 55-59.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43234-7_13

Abstract

The current Hungarian foreign policy is committed to the integration of the Western Balkan countries and has been supportive in this regard ever since the country first gained European Union (EU) Membership in 2004. Hungary borders the Western Balkans and hence the region’s stability is crucial in both political and economic senses. However, compared to its previous strategy, the EU is now more cautious, preferring a stricter conditionality and slower accession for (potential) candidate countries. By contrast, Hungary is keen to speed up enlargement and would not only want to accelerate the process, but would also prefer to ease accession conditions. Nevertheless, it is recognised that rapid enlargement could undermine the entire European integration project’s internal cohesion and thus do more harm than good.

A Czina, V., Szigetvári, T., Túry, G.: Enlargement at All Costs? A View from Hungary bejegyzés először VGI-én jelent meg.